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The Influence of Corporate Income Taxes on Investment Location:   
Evidence from Corporate Headquarters Relocations 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study examines the specific effects of jurisdictions’ corporate tax policies on firms’ 
corporate headquarters location decisions. For identification, we rely on changes in state 
corporate income tax rates across time and states. On average, a 1% reduction in rate is 
associated with a reduction in the likelihood of cross-state headquarters relocation ranging 
from 9.3% to 27%. Further examination of the unique tax policy features within the state 
apportionment system support the interpretation that taxation drives this effect. We contribute 
to the literature on corporate decision-making by showing how state income taxation policy 
affects real corporate decisions with significant economic consequences for the company and 
the state. 
JEL: D22, H25, H73 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate managers and governments engage in complex interactions as managers 
strive to maximize after-tax value and governments attempt to encourage economic 
development while raising tax revenues. In this process, firms often organize their operations 
to reduce exposure to higher-tax jurisdictions. In anticipation of this response, governments 
either lower tax rates or implement measures to curb income shifting. At the international 
level, the European Union is debating a system by which firms would consolidate their 
European activities into a single tax calculation, and the earnings would be apportioned 
among the member states. This so-called Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base system 
shares many features with the present state-level system within the United States.  
Even with an apportionment system, U.S. state governments adopt various tax 
policies to retain or attract businesses (Gupta and Hofmann, 2003; Cohn, 2015; Wilson, 
2015) and firms respond to this multidimensional environment. In this paper, we focus on the 
specific issue of the relation between U.S. states’ corporate income tax rates and companies’ 
decisions to move their headquarters (HQ). This is an important question because many 
jurisdictions frequently use various tax policies, including tax rates, to retain and/or attract 
firms. However, documenting the effect of a tax policy on the decision to move the HQ is 
challenging because the move involves many factors; corporate income tax is just one. For 
example, in the case of General Electric (GE), which relocated its HQ from Fairfield, Conn. 
to Boston in 2016, the factors cited include not only escaping a 9% state tax rate in favor of a 
lower rate, and a negotiated $145 million dollar incentive but also a vibrant new area in a 
major city with better access to high tech workers relevant to its new strategic theme (Lohr, 
2016; Marks, 2016). This points to an empirical challenge that the decision to move the 
corporate headquarters is made concurrently with other corporate policies and is influenced 
by other state factors, typically making causal effects difficult to identify. 
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We address the identification issues associated with examining the relation between 
jurisdictions’ tax policies and HQ expatriations using tax data from U.S. states, where rate 
changes are frequent. Ljungqvist, Zhang, and Zuo (2017) and Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) 
exploit changes in state corporate tax rates across time and across states as quasi-experiments 
while controlling for other state tax and non-tax factors.1 The staggered nature of state 
corporate tax changes provides a set of counterfactuals about how HQ relocations would have 
occurred in the absence of tax rate changes, which helps us to disentangle the effects of state 
tax policies from the other push/pull factors driving relocation (Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015). 
Our approach is also in the spirit of the seminal paper by Cummins, Hasset and Hubbard 
(1996), which employs tax reforms in 14 OECD countries to identify significant effects of tax 
changes on investment. 
To develop our hypothesis on the effect of changes in the state corporate tax rates on 
HQ relocation, we first assume that prior to any change in the state corporate tax rate, a 
firm’s HQ location is determined by the cost-benefit tradeoffs of being in one location versus 
others. For example, some firms locate their HQ in a high-tax state in exchange for access to 
a highly skilled labor force. Firms consider relocating their HQ only when the marginal 
benefits exceed the marginal costs. Because our empirical strategy regresses changes in HQ 
locations on shocks to state corporate tax rates, our design maps well onto the above 
conceptual framework of disruptions to location equilibriums.  
Using a sample of relocating and non-relocating firms between 1998 and 2010, we 
first establish a strong and robust positive association between the state corporate tax rate 
changes and the likelihood of HQ relocation after including extensive controls for other tax-
related, economic, and political factors at the firm and state levels. This evidence is robust to 
the inclusion of firm fixed effects. Economically, the effect is significant: the average 
                                                 
1 Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) and Ljungqvist et al. (2017) examine the effects of tax rate changes on firms’ 
leverage choices and corporate risk-taking, respectively. 
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marginal effect of a one-percentage-point decrease in the HQ state corporate tax rate will 
decrease the likelihood of firms relocating their HQ by 9.3% to 27%, depending on the model 
specification.  
We exploit several features of the state apportionment system to provide further 
support for a causal interpretation of the observed effect. Specifically, using the state 
apportionment formula as a theoretical basis, we develop cross-sectional predictions about 
how other important determining factors may moderate the firm’s HQ relocation decision. 
First, the state corporate tax rate is embedded explicitly in the state tax apportionment 
formula, not unlike the proposals in Europe. The apportionment system allocates corporate 
income based on inputs, property and payroll, and output, sales. A firm’s HQ includes a 
significant amount of property and payroll, which causes its location to alter the allocation of 
income across states. 2 Over time, states have changed the factor weights to encourage more 
within-state firm activities. Relying on these cross-state and cross-time variations in factor 
weights, we find evidence that states with low weights on property and payroll have a weaker 
relation between corporate tax rate changes and HQ relocations, consistent with tax rates 
driving the main results.  
Second, the HQ is not the typical investment modeled in the extant literature (e.g., 
Hasset and Hubbard, 2002). In typical models, capital and labor yield output that is taxed. 
The HQ, on the other hand, is an overhead cost that can be placed in a separate location from 
more directly productive assets. Conventional multijurisdictional tax planning would 
recommend that such assets be placed in higher-tax-rate jurisdictions, not lower-tax-rate 
ones.3 Under apportionment systems, the tax planning is more nuanced. Separately 
                                                 
2 A more detailed discussion is provided in Section 2. Briefly, the apportionment system uses relative amounts 
of three factors: sales, payroll, and property in the state to determine how states allocate overall corporate profits 
to the particular state. However, states weight these factors differently. Corporate headquarters are typically 
associated with significant expenditures on office buildings and payroll, two elements of the system, as 
headquarters are home to a firm’s top management and executives. 
3 See, for example, Klassen, Lang, and Wolfson (1993); Collins, Kemsley, and Lang (1998); Weichenrieder 
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incorporated subsidiaries may not be subject to apportionment, depending on the state’s rules. 
Mintz and Smart (2004) show that income shifting can be facilitated across Canadian 
provinces by separately incorporating activities within different provinces because tax 
consolidation is not done in Canada. If the state does not require consolidation, the firm can 
separately incorporate the HQ and avoid the adverse effects of high corporate tax rates. For 
states that do not require consolidation, we find that a change in tax rate is not a predictor of 
relocation, consistent with this more complete analysis.  
Finally, we argue that aggressive tax planning reduces the taxable income attributed 
to the headquarters, which in turn reduces the effect of any corporate tax rate changes. 
Similarly, receiving a direct subsidy from the government also reduces the net state corporate 
income tax. Consistent with these expectations, we find that a greater ability to engage in tax 
planning and receiving direct state subsidies reduce the relation between firms relocating 
their HQ and corporate tax rate changes. These three results provide further identification of 
the effects of corporate tax rate changes.  
Although we cannot definitely rule out the possibility of a correlated omitted variable, 
to explain our collective results, such an omitted variable would have to be (i) correlated with 
corporate investment decisions, in particular HQ relocation choices, (ii) vary systematically 
with the staggered changes in state apportionment formula over time, and (iii) cause a 
systematic difference in the likelihood of relocations among firms with different tax filing 
requirements and subsidies. Though we believe that it is unlikely that a correlated omitted 
factor is responsible for our results, we undertake additional analyses to address identification 
assumptions underlying our difference-in-differences framework. First, one crucial 
assumption of a differences-in-differences research design is that if the event had not 
occurred, the two groups of firms would have continued to exhibit the same time trend in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
(2009); Klassen and Laplante (2012a; 2012b); Martini, Niemann, and Simons (2012); Dharmapala and Riedel 
(2013); Dharmapala (2014); and De Simone, Klassen, and Seidman (2017). 
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outcome. We test this parallel trend assumption and we do not find any evidence that this 
assumption is violated. The second requirement for our identification strategy is that state 
corporate income tax changes do not systematically coincide with variations in local business 
cycles or other state-level policies or conditions. To the extent that local shocks 
independently affect firms’ operation decisions, some or all of the relocation choices may 
reflect the effects of a local economic shock that might be spuriously correlated with 
corporate tax changes. Our specifications have already controlled for an extensive array of 
observed state economic and political conditions and policies. To further address this 
concern, we carry out border state analysis where we restrict our sample to firms with an HQ 
in a border region. This test exploits the fact that economic conditions are likely to be similar 
across state borders, while the effects of tax policies stop at a state’s border. This sharp 
discontinuity in tax policy allows us to difference away any effects from unobserved 
confounding factors (e.g., social, economic, and political) that are centric to certain 
geographic locations. Our conclusions are not affected in this alternative specification. 
This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, it provides an examination 
of how taxation policy affects an important real corporate decision by incorporating features 
of the state corporate tax system, exploiting staggered changes in state corporate tax rates, 
and applying unique HQ relocation data (Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015; Ljungqvist et al., 
2017). The relation between taxes and investment location has been examined empirically in 
various settings (e.g., Bartik, 1985; Papke, 1991; Harris, 1993; Hines and Rice, 1994; 
Chirinko and Wilson, 2008) and using field studies (Wilson, 1993; Single, 1999). Compared 
to prior empirical work that uses association-type design choices, our research strengthens the 
identification of the effects of changes in state tax rates, a more broadly applicable tax policy 
instrument, on firms’ headquarters relocation within the U.S., a real corporate decision with 
significant economic consequences for the company and the state. 
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Second, our paper adds to the literature on state tax planning, an important issue in its 
own right. Managers maximize firm value by pursuing opportunities to reduce tax liabilities 
as long as the expected incremental benefits exceed the incremental cost (Slemrod, 2004; 
Scholes, Wolfson, Erickson, Hanlon, Maydew, and Shevlin, 2014). Petroni and Shackelford 
(1995) document evidence consistent with property/casualty insurers structuring their cross-
state expansion to mitigate overall state tax and regulatory costs. Dyreng, Lindsey, and 
Thornock (2013) find that the firms that are most likely to implement a common Delaware-
based state tax avoidance strategy have significantly lower state effective tax rates. Allee, 
Lynch, Petroni, and Schroeder (2015) find that firms manage crude oil inventories to reduce 
personal property tax. However, to the best of our knowledge, research has yet to address 
operating decisions’ responsiveness to state tax policy. In particular, how state tax policies 
affect HQ location is an important question. Where a firm locates its HQ can have significant 
economic effects on the local community, including job creation and knowledge spillover 
benefits (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson, 1993; Garcia-Mila and McGuire, 2002). A recent 
joint report by the Tax Foundation and KPMG, Location Matters: The State Tax Costs of 
Doing Business, states the following:  
State and local taxes represent a significant business cost for corporations 
operating in the U.S. and can have a material effect on net operating margins. 
Consequently, business location decisions for new manufacturing facilities, 
corporate HQ relocations, and the like are often influenced by assessments of 
relative tax burdens across multiple states. (Tax Foundation and KPMG, 2015, 1)  
Explicitly evaluating the outcomes of the interactions between components within the 
state tax apportionment formula, firms’ other tax planning strategies, and firm-specific 
inducement from state government, our paper provides timely and comprehensive evidence 
of state tax planning via HQ relocations. 
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2. Hypothesis Development 
State corporate tax rate changes and HQ relocation   
Klassen and Shackelford (1998), Dyreng et al. (2013), and the Tax Foundation and 
KPMG (2015) provide a useful background for multijurisdictional tax planning at the state 
level. Briefly, when firms expand their operations into multiple states, state taxation becomes 
more complex because firms are subject to taxation in each state in which they have a 
presence. Each state has its own set of tax policies and rates on the income earned within its 
borders. Therefore, when a given firm earns profits in different states, each state will compute 
its share of the profits attributable to activity within its borders. 
A key structural feature of state corporate income tax in the U.S. is the apportionment 
formula used to subdivide multistate firms’ income among the jurisdictions in which they 
have economic nexus (Gupta and Hofmann, 2003; Tax Foundation and KPMG, 2015). A 
corporation’s business income is apportioned among states according to the portions of its 
sales, payroll, and property in each state. In theory, these factors fairly reflect the income 
attributable to each state. Specifically, a multistate firm’s income tax expense x in any 
particular state i is computed by the following formula: 
                  , (1) 
where π is the firm’s U.S. taxable income;  is the statutory corporate tax rate in state i; si, li, 
and pi are, respectively, the firm’s sales, payroll, and property in state i; S, L, and P are the 
firm’s total sales, payroll, and property, respectively; and , , and  respectively are 
the factor weights in state i for sales, payroll, and property, and these weights sum to one.4 
Thus, the term in square brackets is the percentage of a firm’s income taxable in state i and 
the term in curly brackets is the firm’s income taxable in state i. For all states, 
                                                 
4 A more detailed discussion of these factors is provided in the next section. 
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                                                                                         (2) 
Substituting (2) into (1) and rearranging leads to the following equation: 
                   (3) 
As Equation (3) shows, a firm can lower its state tax liability by relocating its HQ to a state 
with a lower tax rate. First, assuming that state i has a lower tax rate, HQ relocation increases 
the proportion of a firm’s payroll and property in the state, . Keeping all other terms 
within the square brackets constant, this move will increase the percentage of a firm’s income 
taxable at a lower tax rate, ri, and decrease the amount of state taxes the firm pays. The effect 
of HQ relocation on the proportion of a firm’s sales, , is ambiguous because the effect of 
HQ location on state sales is contingent on many factors, including whether the state is an 
important market for the firm and whether a firm’s HQ location affects customer goodwill. In 
sum, given the apportionment formula, it is clear that even if a firm is already operating in 
state i (e.g., selling goods and services to residents of state i), corporate HQ location in state i 
is strongly related to the firm’s state i tax liability. 
The objective of our study is to examine how changes in corporate taxes in the state 
where the HQ is located influence relocation. The simple framework guiding our analysis is 
as follows. With regard to its HQ location in the current state, we assume that a firm takes 
into account the costs and benefits that arise from the relevant factors (e.g., the availability of 
a labor force to staff its HQ, wages, proximity to its suppliers and customers, and taxes). That 
is, we assume that the firm is in an “optimal” HQ location equilibrium. We then rely on 
changes in corporate tax rates in the current state to identify relocation decisions that are 
likely to be caused by the mechanics of the state tax apportionment formula. We argue that a 
change in the HQ state corporate tax rate alters the equilibrium HQ location choice of firms, 
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providing a catalyst for firms, especially those that are more sensitive to the state tax burden 
in their HQ state, to consider a potential HQ relocation.5  
In terms of Equation (3), we argue that with a positive derivative of xi with respect to 
ri, when state i increases ri, it increases the likelihood of HQ relocation out of state i. Hence, 
our first hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is as follows: 
H1: Changes in state corporate tax rates are positively related to the likelihood of a 
corporate HQ relocating out of the state. 
  
 Our next hypothesis focuses on the fact that while an increase in the corporate tax 
rate provides an impetus for HQ relocation, other considerations related to state tax planning 
and the unique features of the state tax system with regards to the HQ might either exacerbate 
or mitigate the relocation likelihood. In particular, we focus on four pre-existing conditions to 
provide further support for a causal interpretation of the observed tax sensitivity of HQ 
relocation in hypothesis H1: (i) whether the state applies a reduced apportionment weight to 
assets and payroll, (ii) whether the corporation is forced to include the HQ assets and payroll 
in the state apportionment formula through consolidation,6 (iii) whether other tax planning 
reduces the state tax burden associated with the HQ, and lastly (iv) whether firms receive 
firm-specific inducement from state government to remain within state. We predict that these 
state and firm features will reduce the effect of any state tax rate changes.  
H2: The positive association between a change in the HQ’s corporate tax rate and the 
likelihood of HQ relocation is mitigated for firms with state tax payments that are less 
sensitive to assets and payroll in the state. 
                                                 
5 As noted in the introduction, the fact that many migration factors exist and might be unobservable/non-
measurable by the researcher could result in significant endogeneity concerns. A firm chooses the location of its 
headquarters based on several possibly correlated factors. Hence, relying on an analysis that focuses on a 
disruption to the location equilibrium and controlling for observable factors helps to mitigate such concerns.  
6 The firm would not include enough income in such a corporation to ensure that the taxable income of the 
subsidiary was close to zero. Aiding in the process is the fact that certain types of income, such as investment 
income, is typically considered to be related to the HQ. 
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Cross-sectional analyses: the apportionment factor weights on property and payroll 
Equation (3) indicates that the relation between changes in state taxes and changes in 
state corporate tax rates varies with the weight of the sales factor. The Uniform Division of 
Income for Tax Purpose Act (UDITPA), introduced in 1957, proposed a three-factor model 
for apportioning the income of a corporation that is taxable in more than one state: a sales 
factor, a property factor, and a payroll factor. However, in Moorman Manufacturing Co v. 
Bair [437 U.S. 267 (1978)], the Supreme Court ruled that the three-factor formula was not 
constitutionally required and that Iowa could use a sales-only apportionment formula. With 
each state free to choose the weights of the apportionment factors, the sum of a corporation’s 
income attributed to its nexus states rarely equals its total income. 
One common critique of equally weighting the three components in the state tax 
apportionment formula is that it creates a disincentive for capital investment and job creation 
in the state (Weiner, 1999; Tax Foundation and KPMG, 2015). Since 1978, many states have 
increased the weight of the sales factor, with some relying on it completely. Many states have 
reasoned that placing more weight on the sales factor (and hence less weight on the property 
and payroll factors) provides state tax relief to businesses that have significant property and 
payroll in the state, thereby rewarding those businesses (Griffith, 2014). Consistent with this 
claim, Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) find that for the average state, cutting the payroll weight 
from one-third to one-quarter leads to a 1.1% increase in manufacturing employment. 
Goolsbee, Maydew, and Schadewald (2000) find that eliminating the weights on payroll and 
property in Wisconsin resulted in 2.9% and 2.4% growth in manufacturing and non-
manufacturing employment, respectively. Gupta and Hofmann (2003) show that new capital 
expenditures by corporations in the manufacturing sector are decreasing in the income tax 
burden on property, which is the product of the corporate tax rate and the property factor 
weight. Our first test of hypothesis H2 focuses on the interaction between tax rate changes 
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and factor weights. 
Based on the state tax apportionment formula, there is an intuitive link between the 
factor weights and relocation-related tax savings. Assume that the weight on the sales factor 
for a state is 100% and that the weights on the payroll and property factors are 0%. Further 
assume that having the HQ in the state affects the amounts of property and payroll but not the 
amount of sales in the state. It can be observed from the formula that an increase in the state 
corporate tax rate does not create incentives to decrease the amounts of property and payroll 
in the state because the apportionment formula weights for these amounts are zero. In other 
words, the tax savings from relocating out of the state are limited because the taxable income 
in the state is not a function of property and payroll. Hence, conditional on an increase in the 
corporate tax rate in a state, lower weights on the property and payroll factor reduce 
incentives to move out of the state. The logic applies similarly in a tax rate cut scenario, 
where HQ firms’ likelihood of staying in the state is less affected. More generally, the 
likelihood of HQ relocation would be less sensitive to any state tax rate changes in state-years 
with lower factor weights on property and payroll.  
Cross-sectional analyses: the firm’s ability to isolate HQ activities from the apportionment 
formula 
The application of the state formula apportionment formula, represented by Equation 
(3), varies by state as noted above. One feature of the apportionment formula is that it may be 
applied at the level of the corporation rather than the consolidated group. Two common 
strategies to locate income in low-tax-rate states is to separately incorporate low margin 
activities, such as the HQ, in high-tax-rate states and minimize cross-state charges, and to 
separately incorporate high margin activities, such as intangible assets, in low-tax-rate states 
and maximize cross-state charges.  
In recent years, U.S. states have implemented various measures to combat aggressive 
tax planning strategies that take advantage of these opportunities offered by state tax rules. 
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The main policies that states have implemented include (1) requiring combined reporting, 
which requires businesses to report the operations of all related entities involved in a unitary 
business on a combined basis (i.e., consolidated reporting) and (2) expense add-back statutes 
or “add-back” rules, which require adding back deductions related to the use of single 
purpose entities, such as the use of passive investment companies (Fox and Luna, 2010). 
Both anti-avoidance measures are adopted by states aiming to deter aggressive state tax 
avoidance and hence increase the share of tax revenue from corporate income tax sources 
(Fox and Luna, 2002). We predict that the tax sensitivity of HQ relocation is smaller for firms 
with an HQ located in state-years without such anti-avoidance measures (i.e., states with a 
separate filing system without add-back rules). 
Cross-sectional analyses: the firm’s international tax planning opportunities 
Referring to Equation (3), beyond the factor weights, another key determinant of state 
taxes is the amount of taxable income. For example, if a firm is able to maintain a very low 
level of income that is subject to tax in the headquarters’ state, then any change in the state 
corporate tax rate will have a minimal effect on its state tax liability. Research suggests that 
firms can influence this component via tax planning activities (Rego, 2003; Dyreng and 
Lindsey, 2009; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). Hence, to provide a richer analysis of the 
interaction between the different components of the state tax apportionment formula, we 
focus on taxable income. In particular, given that taxable income is not publicly observable, 
we examine the role of actions that could reduce this component. 
Prior research has examined how aggressive tax planning affects corporate decisions 
related to capital structure (Graham and Tucker, 2006), debt financing choice (Hasan, Hoi, 
Wu, and Zhang, 2014), and the location of foreign subsidiaries (Dyreng, Lindsey, Markle, 
and Shackelford, 2015). Our analyses of tax planning activities are unique in that we examine 
how existing tax planning opportunities affect a firm’s likelihood of HQ relocation when 
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there is an exogenous change in the HQ state corporate tax rates. First, for firms with a lower 
amount of income subject to state taxation, state tax rate changes would have little effect on 
their decision to remain in the state or to relocate their HQ given their minimal exposure to 
state income taxes. Second, the presence of tax planning opportunities implies that the firm 
has other means of reducing the impact of state tax hikes, hence reducing the expected tax 
savings from HQ relocation. Therefore, our third cross-sectional test focuses on the 
interaction between tax rate changes and the firm’s existing tax planning opportunities. In this 
test, we focus on the firm’s international tax planning opportunities or firms that can better 
leverage their tax planning opportunities with their foreign operations in order to capture a 
dimension of tax planning that is orthogonal to the characteristics of state taxation as 
described above. 
Cross-sectional analyses: firm-specific inducements from the HQ state 
State governments sometimes provide firms with inducements to attract or keep 
business activities in the state. Over the past three decades, state and local governments in the 
U.S. have awarded corporations more than $64 billion in inducement packages designed to 
encourage investment and the creation or retention of jobs (Mattera, Tarczynska, and LeRoy, 
2013). Tax breaks are a common type of financial incentive given to companies by state and 
local governments to encourage the growth of business activity and job creation within their 
borders. This type of deal began in the late 1970s, when state and local officials in 
Pennsylvania put together a package worth about $100 million to persuade Volkswagen to 
build its assembly plant in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania. Since the 1980s, large 
packages have been awarded to many of the largest and best-known U.S. companies and to 
foreign companies doing business there.  
Mattera et al. (2013) show that 16 of the Fortune 50 companies received inducements 
from state and local governments. For example, in 2009, Michigan offered General Motors 
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$2.1 billion in MEGA tax credits over a 20-year period to encourage within-state investment 
and job creation (Livengood, 2015). Other examples include Oregon’s efforts to retain Nike 
(Cooper, 2012). On the issues of state and local government subsidies, Mattera, Tarczynska 
and LeRoy (2013, 12), report: 
In some instances, companies are awarded large deals after they threaten to 
leave the state, or at least let it be known that they are considering such a 
move. For example, last year Nike got the state of Oregon to guarantee that it 
could enjoy single sales factor tax breaks for 30 years after warning that it 
might otherwise move some of its operations elsewhere. The agreement was 
worth an estimated $2 billion to the company. Nike was following in the 
footsteps of various media and financial companies that engaged in job 
blackmail in New York City in the 1980s and 1990s, and firms such as Sears 
Holdings and Motorola Mobility that did the same in Illinois in 2011. 
Hence, because firms may lose the benefits offered by the state government upon HQ 
relocation, those that receive inducements from the HQ state government are less likely to 
engage in HQ relocation.  
To test our hypothesis, we also examine whether the tax sensitivity of HQ relocation 
is weaker for firms receiving inducements. It is unclear whether there is a moderating effect, 
on average, because tax rate changes are both increasing and decreasing. For increases in tax 
rates, state inducements may offset an increase’s effects; however, for decreases in tax rates, 
it is unclear if the two tax features are complements or substitutes or if they are simply 
additive. 
3. Empirical Design 
Sample selection 
We select our sample based on several criteria. First, to identify corporate relocation 
within the U.S., we rely on the disclosed business address on firms’ annual 10-K filings for 
their HQ location. We obtain these data on firms’ HQ locations from Professor McDonald’s 
website. While the data include all filings from 1994 to 2010, because the SEC did not 
require online filing until May 1996, the number of observations in the dataset is much 
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smaller (and biased toward larger firms) for 1994 and 1995.7 There is also limited data 
availability for the construction of control variables in earlier years, so we begin the sample 
period in 1998. We do not use location data from Compustat because Compustat reports the 
address of a firm’s current HQ location and backfills this information for previous years.  
To be included in the sample, each firm-year observation is required to have financial 
information available from the Compustat database and the necessary state-level information 
available from a variety of sources, such as the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the 
websites of state governments. We further restrict the sample to non-financial firms (SIC 
6000–6999). We exclude firm-years that engage in merger and acquisition (M&A) activities 
within the two years preceding a state corporate income tax rate change to reduce the concern 
that HQ relocations are driven by M&A activities.8 This leaves us with a final sample of 
6,499 firms and 31,607 firm-year observations for our sample period. We obtain the data on 
changes in state corporate income tax rates from Heider and Ljungqvist (2015).9 For ease of 
reference, Appendix A presents a list of states that have changed their corporate tax rates and 
the number of firms (within our sample) in each state when the changes occurred. For more 
detailed information about these changes, we refer readers to Heider and Ljungqvist’s 
Appendix A (2015, 709). 
The state income tax burden could be mitigated when firms receive or are in a 
position to bargain for special tax treatment from state and local governments. Over our 
sample period, we hand-collect information on firm-specific packages provided by state 
governments, including job creation tax credits and subsidies. The data were collected from 
                                                 
7 http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/10-K_Headers/10-K_Headers.html. To determine the location of a firm’s 
headquarters, all of the fields appearing in the headers of 10-K forms (including 10-K405, 10KSB, and 
10KSB40 forms) were parsed. The Edgar online filing system was gradually phased in from 1994 to 1998. 
8 Our conclusions are not affected if we include these firm-year observations and control for whether a firm 
engages in M&A activities. 
9 To identify the changes, Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) use data obtained from the Tax Foundation, the Book of 
the States, by searching the “Current Corporate Income Tax Developments” feature published periodically in the 
Journal of State Taxation, and from state codes accessed through Lexis-Nexis. In states with more than one tax 
bracket, Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) report the change to the top bracket. 
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Good Jobs First’s Subsidy Tracker database (GJFST);10 they consist of official data provided 
by state and local governments. States provide this information mainly to increase 
accountability regarding state economic development subsidies. GJFST supplements the 
official data using a variety of information from other sources, including government and 
corporate press releases, newspaper articles, and reports on specific projects to provide 
information on subsidy amounts, company information, the status and timing of awards, job 
outcomes, wage outcomes, and project information. The disclosure of company-specific data 
on economic development subsidies is becoming an increasingly common practice among 
state governments (Mattera et al., 2013). Among the 6,499 firms in our final sample, fewer 
than 10% (619 firms) received special tax treatments or subsidies from state or local 
governments. The value of special tax treatments is highly skewed, with a median value of 
$0.2 million, a mean of $3.9 million, and a maximum value of $3.2 billion.  
Empirical design and identification 
We use a difference-in-difference approach to identify the effect of corporate tax rate 
increases on HQ relocation. Figure 1 provides a timeline of our measurements. We examine 
the effect of corporate tax rate changes in a state in year t-1 on an HQ relocating out of the 
state in the following year.11 We lag all of our independent variables by one year to mitigate 
the concern that corporate relocation decisions may drive changes in tax policies. To the 
extent that firms relocate in anticipation of a tax rate increase or take more than one year to 
complete a relocation after the tax rate increases, the likelihood of a significant association 
between corporate tax rate changes and HQ relocation is reduced. Following Heider and 
Ljungqvist (2015) and Ljungqvist et al. (2017), we specify a difference-in-differences 
regression in following form: 
                                                 
10 www.goodjobsfirst.org. 
11 It is important to note that a firm might already have expectations of the tax change before year t-1 because of 
previous deliberations on the tax change. We focus on the year of the actual change in corporate tax rates to be 
consistent with Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) and to avoid having to make judgments about the likelihood of the 
passage of a change based on deliberations. 
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             HQ Relocationi,s,t = β0 + β1ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rates,t–1  
                 + φΔState-level Controlss,t–1 + φΔFirm-level Controls i,s,t–1 + FE + 𝜀i,s,t,                   (4) 
where i, s, and t index firms, states, and years, respectively, and HQ Relocationi,s,t is an 
indicator equal to one if a firm relocates its HQ to another state between year t-1 and year t, 
and zero otherwise. Note that relocation is, by construction, a change variable. Our 
independent variable of interest is the change in the firm’s HQ state corporate income tax rate 
from year t-2 to year t-1 (ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rates,t–1). Its coefficient (β1) tests H1 and 
measures the effect of changes in state corporate tax rates on the likelihood of relocation. 
ΔState-level Controlss,t–1 and ΔFirm-level Controlss,t–1 denote vectors of control variables 
measured in changes from year t-2 to year t-1, and FE denotes  industry×year fixed effects 
(Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015; Ljungqvist et al., 2017), as discussed in more detail below. 
Note that Equation (4) is estimated in the first difference to remove firm fixed effects in the 
levels equations. Following Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) and Ljungqvist et al. (2017), we 
cluster standard errors at the state level according to the state in which the HQ is located at 
time t-112. We use a linear probability model as our baseline model to better accommodate 
higher dimensional fixed effects, but we also report marginal effect estimates using a logit 
model in our robustness analysis. 
A major advantage of our design is that it mitigates omitted correlated variable biases 
because relocation decisions might be endogenous to correlated factors. In addition to first 
differencing, which removes unobserved stable firm effects, staggered changes in corporate 
tax rates across states help to create a set of counterfactuals (i.e., matched firms that 
experience different tax amounts, including no change to corporate tax rates) to better test our 
hypotheses of how “tax shocks” to HQ state corporate tax rates affect relocation decisions 
(Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015; Ljungqvist et al., 2017). The use of fixed effects also helps to 
                                                 
12 Our results remain robust if we cluster the standard errors at firm level or at firm and year level. 
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mitigate concerns that our results are affected by various omitted invariant factors. Hence, 
there are likely to be fewer endogeneity concerns with our research design compared to a 
regression specification that examines location characteristics and the level of corporate tax 
rates. 
Nevertheless, we recognize that changes in corporate tax rates are not random and 
hence are not pure shocks to the equilibrium HQ location decision. For example, such 
changes might be correlated with other macroeconomic state factors that could drive 
relocation decisions. To further address concerns about endogeneity, we include an extensive 
array of controls that could be associated with changes in state tax rates and corporate HQ 
relocation. Specifically, we include four sets of variables to control for 1) various other state 
tax policies that might coincide with changes in state corporate tax policies, 2) firm-level 
characteristics, 3) state economic conditions, and 4) state political factors. 
Control variables 
Control variables related to firm-level characteristics 
 Tax changes may affect the tax shield benefits that a firm can derive from debt 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1963). Consistent with the tax shield making debt more attractive 
than equity as a source of financing, Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) find that leverage 
increases following an increase in corporate tax rates. Hence, we control for changes in 
leverage (∆Leverage). We also control for changes in various firm-level variables that could 
affect corporate tax decisions (Strauss-Kahn and Vives, 2009; Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015): 
changes in profitability and revenue (∆ROA and ∆Sales Growth), ∆Firm Size as measured by 
changes in the log of total assets, and changes in growth opportunities (∆Market-to-Book). 
Gupta and Mills (2002) find that firms operate in a substantial number of state jurisdictions 
may face lower cost of relocation, especially to the states with established operations.  To 
adequately controls for the decision to move headquarters to another operating jurisdiction 
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for which the cost of the move is low, we include ∆Multi-State Operation, which is measured 
by changes in the number of states in which the firm has a material subsidiary operation. 
Control variables related to state economic conditions 
States may change tax rates in response to changes in local economic conditions. 
Specifically, they may change their corporate income taxes because of local demand shocks 
or other changes to their economic conditions. To the extent that these economic conditions 
also affect firms’ relocation propensity, any observed correlation between taxes and the 
likelihood of relocation could be spurious. To mitigate this concern, we add controls for state-
level economic conditions.  
First, we control for changes in state-level economic conditions using the state-level 
real GSP growth rate (∆Real GSP Growth). Second, we control for the state’s fiscal health by 
controlling for changes in the state’s fiscal position (∆State Budget Balance). Finally, to 
mitigate the concerns that firms relocate to get better access to skilled labour (Strauss-Kahn 
and Vives, 2009), we control for average education level of a state or quality of labor force , 
which is measured as changes in the percentage of people 25 years and over with a bachelor 
degree or above within the state (∆State Education). 
Control variables related to other state tax policies 
While we focus on changes in corporate tax rates to determine the causal effect of tax 
rates on HQ relocation, it is possible that concurrent changes to other state tax policies drive 
changes with regard to both corporate tax rates and corporate relocations. For example, 
changes in corporate tax rates may coincide with changes in personal income tax rates and 
the provision of state job tax credits (Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015). To address the concern 
that firms relocate in response to other policies, as opposed to changes in corporate tax rates 
and that these polices are correlated with changes in corporate tax rates, we control for 
changes in the following state tax policies: the weight on the sales factor in the state 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2867298 
 20 
 
apportionment formula (∆Sales Factor Weight), state separate filing rules 
(∆Separate_NoAddback), an investment tax credit (∆Investment Tax Credit), and personal 
income tax rate (∆HQ Personal Tax Rate). Finally, we control for the maximum statutory tax 
rate differential with neighboring states (∆Bordering States Tax Diff) to mitigate concerns 
that states alter corporate tax policy in response to “beauty contests” with neighboring states,  
Fixed effects 
In addition to including a large array of firm- and state-level controls, we incorporate 
a combination of different fixed effects to further mitigate concerns arising from omitted 
variable bias. We include industry×year fixed effects to control for the cross-sectional 
variation in propensity to relocate due to unobservable time-varying industry characteristics. 
For example, industry merger waves could drive the clustering of corporate HQs, and 
industry×year fixed effects would absorb these effects in our estimation.13 Following Heider 
and Ljungqvist (2015), we further include firm fixed effects in some specifications, alongside 
with industry×year fixed effects, to remove unobserved firm-specific trends in relocation 
propensity. 
4. Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the number of cross-state HQ relocations over the sample period of 
1998 to 2010. We find a total of 513 instances of relocations during our sample period, of 
which 279 firms (54%) relocate to lower-tax states. The greatest number of incidences 
occurred in 2000, when 65 firms relocated their HQ. On average, about 1.62% of the firms 
relocated their HQ each year. These corporate relocations do not appear to be clustered in 
periods that correspond with merger waves or technology changes. 
                                                 
13 Our results are similar if we use other industry classifications (the Fama–French 48-industry classification or 
the two-digit NAICS). 
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Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics. All of the continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The average change in the corporate tax rate in our 
sample is about -0.03%, with a standard deviation of 0.7%, suggesting that there is large 
variation in corporate tax rates across states and over time. Untabulated results show that the 
univariate correlations between the different control variables are low. Nevertheless, we also 
run checks to ensure that multicollinearity does not significantly affect our regression results. 
Test of hypothesis H1 
Table 3 provides the results for our hypotheses tests, which predict a positive 
association between the corporate tax rate changes and the likelihood of HQ relocation (H1). 
We progressively add different set of control variables and fixed effects to our model to 
assess the sensitivity of our results. Column (1) reports the results of the specification with 
the firm-level control variables and  industry×year joint fixed effects. Column (2) further 
includes firm fixed effect along with industry×year fixed effects to absorb any confounding 
effects from unobservable firm characteristics. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find a 
positive association between corporate tax rate changes and the probability of HQ relocation. 
In Columns (3) and (4), we further control for state economic factor that might be 
coincidental to corporate tax rate changes. Column (5) and (6) include other state-level tax 
characteristics to ensure that our results are not driven by concurrent changes in state tax 
policies. Across different specifications, we consistently find a positive association between 
corporate tax rate changes and the likelihood of HQ relocation with relatively stable point 
estimates ranging between 15 to 17 basis points. Given the sample mean of Relocation is 
0.0162, our estimate suggests that a one-percentage-point decrease in the HQ corporate tax 
rate will lead to a 9.3% to 10.5% drop in the likelihood of HQ relocation. 
Moving on to the control variables, we find that firm size (total assets) changes are 
positively associated with the likelihood of HQ relocation. One explanation for this result is 
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that expanding firms are more likely to be further from equilibrium because of expanding 
geographic activity. This explanation is also consistent with the positive coefficient on 
ΔMulti-State Operations, which suggests that HQ relocation likelihood increases as the 
firm’s geographic network within the US expands. As a firm increases its multi-state 
operations, any tax rate changes at the HQ state will have a smaller effect, if any, on the 
firm’s overall state tax burden. The results also show that both market-to-book and sales 
growth are negatively associated with HQ relocation, suggesting that firms with higher 
growth potentials are less likely to consider HQ relocation in order to focus on capturing the 
growth opportunities.  
Most of the state economic factors are not significant, except that in the two firm 
fixed effect specifications. Real GSP growth is weakly negatively associated with HQ 
relocation. For state tax characteristics, states income apportionment rules (measured by 
ΔSales Factor Weight) and corporate income filing rules (measured by 
ΔSeperate_NoAddback) consistently affect likelihood of HQ relocation across different 
specifications. This suggests that the likelihood of relocation is unconditionally low for firms 
headquartered in separate filing states without add-back rules or for firms headquartered in 
states with higher sales factor weight or lower property and payroll weights. Both factors 
reduce the incentives or needs to relocate HQ to reduce tax burden.  
Overall, the evidence in Table 3 provides strong evidence that a decrease (an increase) 
in corporate tax rates will reduce (increase) the likelihood of HQ relocation.  
Identification 
Our results for hypothesis H1 show a strong positive association between state 
corporate tax rate changes and the likelihood of cross-state corporate HQ relocation. To 
further establish that the identified effect is causal, we conduct (i) a test of the parallel trends 
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assumption and (ii) an analysis focusing on firms with headquarters in regions near the state 
border.  
Parallel trends assumption  
In general, a differences-in-differences research design estimates the difference in the 
outcomes (i.e., the dependent variable) of an event of interest for two groups of firms that 
differ in the extent to which the event affects them. The difference between the changes (or 
“differences”) experienced by the two groups of firms provides an estimate of the event’s 
causal effect on the outcome.  
The crucial assumption of a differences-in-differences research design is that if the 
event had not occurred, the two groups of firms would have continued to exhibit the same 
time trend in the outcome. This parallel trends assumption facilitates inferences about the 
causal effect of the event by allowing the relatively less affected group to be used as a 
counterfactual against which to compare the relatively more affected group.  
To assess the validity of this assumption, we examine whether firms with different 
levels of exposure to state tax changes did, in fact, exhibit parallel trends before the event. In 
particular, we follow Heider and Ljungqvist and estimate Equation (5) below, which is 
analogous to Equation (4) except that we replace our variable of interest ΔHQ Corporate Tax 
with the indicator variables HQ Tax Increases,t–1 and HQ Tax Decreases,t–1, which 
respectively equal one if a state increases or decreases the statutory tax rate in year t-1, and 
zero otherwise.14 We also include the lead and lags of these indicators covering two years 
ahead and after any any tax increases and decreases to validate the parallel trend assumption:  
             HQ Relocationi,s,t = β0 + β1HQ Tax Increases,t–1 + β1HQ Tax Decreases,t–1 
                                                 
14 In the dummy variable approach in Equation (5), we include two additional HQ state tax change events (i.e., 
the suspension of the NOL deduction in California in 2002 and the introduction of the AMT in New Jersey in 
2002) as tax increase events (Tax Increase = 1), which is consistent with the approach in Heider and Ljungqvist 
(2015). These tax increase events are not included in our main analysis because they cannot be quantified as an 
amount of rate change. 
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                 + φΔFirm-level Controls i,s,t–1 + φΔState-level Controlss,t–1 + FE + 𝜀i,s,t.                   (5) 
We present the results of this specification in Panel A of Table 4. The results indicate 
that none of the point estimates for the lead terms are statistically significant at conventional 
levels, which is consistent with the maintained assumption that firms with different levels of 
exposure to state tax changes exhibit similar or parallel trends. This provides further evidence 
that changes in HQ state corporate tax rates affect the likelihood of corporate HQ relocation.  
Interestingly, the results in Panel A of Table 4 also suggest an asymmetric effect of 
tax increases vis-à-vis tax decreases. In particular, in column (1), we find that the coefficient 
on HQ Tax Increases,t–1 is positive and is significant at the 10% level, suggesting that 
relocation likelihood increase following an increase in state tax rate last year. In addition, we 
find a statistically significant decrease in the tendency to relocate following decreases in 
corporate tax rates (HQ Tax Decreases,t–1 and HQ Tax Decreases,t). The retention effect of 
state tax decreases on HQ relocation started to show up quickly at year t, albeit the effect is 
only significant at the 10% level. The retention effect of state tax decreases does not appear 
to be short-lived and last at least two years after the tax cut, as evidenced by the significant 
coefficient on HQ Tax Decreases,t–2 (at the 10% level). In column (2) where firm fixed effects 
are included, the coefficient on on HQ Tax Increases,t–1 becomes insignificant. This result is 
consistent with the differential sensitivity of relocation decisions to tax increases vis-à-vis tax 
decreases because firms that relocate their headquarters must incur an upfront switching cost 
before any expected benefits can be realized.15  
Bordering state analysis 
One requirement for our identification strategy is that state corporate income tax 
changes do not systematically coincide with variations in local business cycles or other state-
                                                 
15 In untabulated analysis using a logit specification (without controlling for firm fixed effects), we find that 
both tax increases and tax decreases are both statistically significant, but the marginal effects confirm the 
differential sensitivity that tax hike having a smaller economic effect on HQ relocation (10%) than a tax 
decrease does (14%). 
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level policies or conditions. To the extent that local shocks independently affect firms’ 
operation decisions, some or all of the relocation choices may reflect the effects of a local 
economic shock that is spuriously correlated with corporate tax changes. For example, if 
states raise taxes in economic downturns and such downturns motivate firms to relocate, we 
would observe a spurious correlation between taxes and relocations. 
Our specifications have already controlled for an extensive array of observed state 
economic and political conditions and policies. In addition, our specifications incorporate 
industry and state fixed effects to rule out the concern that our results are driven by correlated 
time-invariant factors that are unobservable at the industry or state level.  
To further address concerns that unobserved changes in local economic conditions 
might affect the likelihood of corporate HQ relocation for reasons unrelated to the tax change 
itself, we restrict our sample to firms with an HQ in a border region. This test exploits the fact 
that economic conditions are likely to be similar across state borders, while the effects of tax 
policies stop at a state’s border. This discontinuity in tax policy allows us to difference away 
any effects from unobserved confounding factors (e.g., social, economic, and political) that 
are centric to certain geographic locations. This test is a form of the sharp regression 
discontinuity approach (Dell, 2010). 
We identify a firm’s county according to its zip code from the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention. We re-estimate our main specification except that our treatment and 
control firms are now restricted to firms with an HQ located within 10 miles of a state border. 
Although this restrictive sample criterion significantly reduces our sample size to 3,072 firm-
year observations with 61 relocating firms (2%), the analysis facilitates inferences about the 
causal effect of tax rate changes by allowing a more economically similar group to be used as 
a counterfactual against which to compare the relatively more affected group. We present this 
analysis in Panel B of Table 4. We continue to find a positive significant effect of corporate 
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tax rate changes on the relocation likelihood. Note that the estimated sensitivities of corporate 
relocation to tax changes in both columns are larger than those under Table 3. One 
explanation is that narrowing the sample of control firms to those sharing arguably similar 
(regional) economic conditions removes the heterogeneity driven by local economic 
conditions. Overall, these results lend further support to a causal interpretation of the 
relationship between tax changes and corporate relocation.16  
5. Test of hypothesis H2: Cross-sectional analyses 
Our results thus far indicate that on average, decreases in the HQ state’s corporate tax 
rate lead to a significant reduction in the likelihood of firms’ cross-state HQ relocation. 
However, pre-existing conditions could moderate this effect. In this section, we examine the 
following two moderating factors: (i) the weight on the sales factor across states and (ii) 
firms’ use of tax planning. These conditions relate to the apportionment weight and the 
taxable income components in the state tax apportionment formula, respectively. To test these 
assertions, we extend Equation (4) by including an interaction between ΔHQ Corporate Tax 
and each condition measured at t-1: 
  HQ Relocationi,s,t = β0 + β1ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rates,t–1×Condition t–1+ β2Condition t–1 
                         + φΔFirm-level Controls i,s,t–1 + φΔState-level Controlss,t–1 + FE + 𝜀i,s,t.        (6) 
Note that Condition is measured at t-1 to capture the interaction effect of a pre-
existing condition (i.e., existing prior to an HQ relocation) and corporate tax rate changes on 
the likelihood of HQ relocation. From a research design perspective, the use of an exogenous 
shock coupled with a pre-existing condition facilitates inferences about how this condition 
moderates the outcome driven by the shock. 
Our first cross-sectional prediction for hypothesis H2 posits that the likelihood of HQ 
relocation would be less sensitive to any state tax rate changes in state-years with lower 
                                                 
16 We discuss and report results of additional robustness checks in Appendices C1 and C2, respectively. 
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factor weights on property and payroll. Historical information about state tax characteristics, 
including factor weights, the use of combined or separate filing, and the use of add-back rules 
are obtained from several sources, including state government websites, the Tax Foundation, 
Tax Analyst, Wolters Kluwer, and CCH.17 Over our sample period, nine states changed their 
factor weights, with all of the changes increasing the weight on the sales factor.18 We create 
an indicator variable, HQ Low Property & Payroll Weights, that is equal to one if a state 
places a weight of less than two-thirds on the sales factor in the state tax apportionment 
formula at year t-1 and zero otherwise. 
Consistent with our prediction, the results in Panel A of Table 5 show that the 
coefficients on ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate × HQ Low Property & Payroll Weights are negative 
and statistically significant at least at the 5% level in both specifications, suggesting that the 
tax sensitivity of HQ relocation is weaker for firms with an HQ located in a state that imposes 
lower weights on property and payroll when calculating taxes. As noted earlier, one key 
reason that many states place lower weights on the property and payroll factors is to 
encourage within-state location of business activities. Our evidence here provides further 
evidence of this tendency (Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000; Goolsbee et al., 2000; Gupta and 
Hofmann, 2003). 
                                                 
17 Wolters Kluwer, CCH provides insightful industry-leading resources and step-by-step guidance on a wide 
variety of tax and accounting issues (https://www.cchgroup.com). The information on factor weights is obtained 
from http://tax.cchgroup.com/onlinestore/productimages/vol1-pages489-505.pdf.  
18 States that used an equally weighted three-factor apportionment formula throughout our sample period (1996–
2010) include Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Kansas, Oklahoma, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Rhode Island. States that used double-
weighted sales factors are Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, 
and West Virginia. States that put 100% weight on sales throughout our sample period are Illinois, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Nebraska, New York, Oregon, and Texas. Michigan (90%), Minnesota (75%), Ohio (60%), and 
Pennsylvania (60%) all assigned a higher weight to sales. Some states changed their factor weights during our 
sample period. Wisconsin (Arizona) gradually changed from a double-weighted sales formula in 2005 (2006) to 
an 80% weight on sales in 2006 (2009). Oregon (Georgia) moved from a double-weighted sales formula in 2003 
(2005) to a 100% weight on sales in 2006 (2008). Utah and Vermont each switched from an equally weighted 
formula to a double weight on sales in 2006 and 2007, respectively. The remaining four states (Nevada, South 
Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming) did not impose state corporate income tax. 
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Next, we turn to the test of our second cross-sectional prediction for hypothesis H2, 
which predicts firms’ HQ relocation likelihood to be less sensitive to changes in state 
corporate income tax for firms headquartered in separate filing states without add-back rules. 
This is because those states allow firms to better isolate their HQ activities from the 
apportionment formula, hence reducing the incentive to relocate subsequent to tax changes. 
Consistent with our prediction, the results reported in Panel B of Table 5 indicate that the 
coefficients on the interaction terms ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate × Separate_NoAddback are 
negative and significant at the 5% level for both specifications. This moderating effect is 
significant enough to offset the increase in HQ relocation likelihood driven by HQ state tax 
increases. 
Our third cross-sectional test for hypothesis H2 examines whether firms’ HQ 
relocation likelihood would be less sensitive to changes in state corporate income tax for 
firms with greater tax planning opportunities, which reduce the firm’s state tax exposure and 
provide a buffer for any state tax changes. Prior research has highlighted the difficulty in 
taxing multinational firms because jurisdictions struggle to determine the firm’s economic 
sources of income (e.g., Dyreng and Lindsey, 2009; Klassen and Laplante, 2012b; De 
Simone, Mills, and Stomberg, 2015). Income-mobile firms, which have business operations 
and asset structures that provide them with greater flexibility in avoiding taxes, may have 
greater opportunities for strategic cross-jurisdictional income shifting and the exploitation of 
other tax incentives (e.g., Chow, Hoopes, Maydew, 2017; De Simone et al., 2015). Following 
De Simone et al. (2015), our second measure of tax planning is Income Mobile, which is an 
indicator of firms associated with opportunities for income-mobile tax planning, which is 
constructed based on firms’ level of foreign sales, R&D expenditures, advertising 
expenditures, gross profit margin, and whether the firm is in the high tech industry. The 
results, reported in Panel C of Table 5, show that the coefficients on the interaction terms 
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(ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate × Income Mobile) are significantly negative in both specifications, 
which is consistent with our prediction that the tax sensitivity of HQ relocation is 
significantly less for firms with more tax planning opportunities.  
Our last cross sectional analysis examines whether the amount of inducements 
received from the HQ state reduces the tax sensitive of HQ relocation. To examine the direct 
effect on HQ relocation likelihood of state inducements and its potential moderating effect 
with corporate tax rate changes, we define a new indicator variable State Inducements that 
equals one if the firm receives inducements from the HQ state in that year and zero 
otherwise. As reported in Table 2, State Inducements has a sample mean of 0.03, suggesting 
that only a small proportion of sample firms receive tax benefits or subsidies from the state 
where their HQ is located. Conditional on the firm receiving inducements, the mean (standard 
deviation) of the annual value of inducements is about 0.35% (0.39%) of the firm’s pre-tax 
domestic income.19 We also interact this variable with ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate to examine 
whether the HQ relocation likelihood for state inducement beneficiaries is less sensitive to 
state tax changes.20 It is important to note that we are not able to observe firms that relocated 
their HQ after unsuccessful attempting to secure inducements from their former HQ state; 
therefore, the results of this test should be interpreted with caution.  
The results are reported in Panel D of Table 5. We find that the coefficients on State 
Inducements are significantly negative in column (1). However, the coefficient becomes 
insignificant (t = –0.64) when firm fixed effects are included in the specification reported in 
                                                 
19 Subsidies given include mega deals of greater than $75 million (1.5% of the sample); tax credits or rebates 
(40.5%), property tax abatements (15%), or a combination of these (8%); enterprise zones (5%); cost or training 
reimbursements (17%); or grants, low-cost loans, or tax increment financing (13%). 
 
20 We do not use the disclosed subsidy value in our empirical test to reduce estimation bias because it is 
uncertain how the estimated value of the subsidy is determined according to Good Jobs First. Despite this, in 
alternative specification, we use both the (natural logarithm of the) total value of the state package and the 
imputed annual average value of the state subsidy as alternative proxies in the regressions. The results using 
these alternative proxies yield similar inferences. About 15 percent of the subsidy packages do not have duration 
information. For such deals, we employ the duration of comparable subsidy packages (i.e., those of the same 
type, of similar total subsidy value, and if available, offered by the same state) in the analyses. The results are 
similar if we exclude the subsidized firms with an undisclosed subsidy duration. 
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column (2), suggesting that State Inducements is largely related to firm-specific factors. In 
terms of moderating effect, the coefficients on the interaction term ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate 
× State Inducements are negative and significant in both specifications at the 10% level, 
suggesting state inducement receiving firms’ HQ relocation decisions are less sensitive to tax 
rate changes in their HQ states. In sum, our findings suggest that inducements from local 
governments are useful in mitigating firms’ HQ relocation likelihood during times of state tax 
changes.21 
6. Supplementary Analyses 
Inbound Analysis of the Choice of Destination State 
In our main analyses, we focus on outbound relocations: how a change in the 
corporate tax rate in the state where the HQ is located affects the HQ’s relocation out of the 
state. In this section, we provide some additional analysis based on inbound relocations—that 
is, how a change in the state’s corporate tax rate affects firms’ HQ relocation into it. To 
analyze inbound relocations, we adopt a different research design because of the unique 
challenges in matching a particular state’s tax rate changes with a firm’s decision about 
whether to relocate there. We focus on a sample of firms that relocate their HQs during our 
sample period. At each point in time, given that a firm’s HQ is already located in either one 
of the 50 states or Washington D.C., each relocating firm can relocate to 50 location choices 
based on various factors, including changes in corporate tax rates.22 There were 513 
relocations during our sample period, resulting in an initial sample of 25,650 (513×50) firm-
state observations for the inbound analysis. Our dependent variable, D(Chosen State), is an 
indicator variable that takes a value of one for the state where a firm relocates its HQ and 
zero otherwise. We estimate the following equation using a firm fixed effect model: 
                                                 
21 GJFST replied on multiple sources to ensure completeness of their data collection. To the extent that firms 
may selectively disclose government subsidies to GJFST database, it works against us in finding a significant 
coefficient. 
22 Dyreng et al. (2015) adopt a similar research design in their analysis of U.S. multinationals’ choices of 
locations of foreign holding companies. 
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           D(Chosen State)i,s,t = β0 + β1State Tax Increase,s,t–1 + β1State Tax Decrease,s,t–1  
                                   + β1State Tax Increase,s,t–2 + β1State Tax Decrease,s,t–2  
                                   + φΔState-level Controlss,t–1 + ϴi + 𝜀i,s,t,                                                          (7) 
where i, s, and t index HQ relocating firms, states, and the year of relocation, respectively, 
and ΔState Tax Increase (Decrease) is an indicator variable that equals one for a state 
corporate income tax rate increase (decrease) in state s in years t-1 and t-2, zero otherwise. 
We include control variables related to state-level tax, economic, and political factors as 
defined for Equation (7). In addition to state-level factors, we create a variable that that 
captures the potential synergy a firm may receive from moving to a synergistic state (Industry 
Match). For example, high tech firms may benefit by relocating to California, where there are 
many such firms. Industry Match is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if a firm is 
in one of the top 10 industries in terms of market capitalization in the state. 
Table 6 presents the results for the inbound analysis. We find that relocating firms are 
more likely to move to a state that has reduced state corporate tax rates in the year prior to 
relocation or that has lower corporate tax rates. This is consistent with our outbound analysis 
that relocation propensity decreases (increases) following a decrease (an increase) in tax rates 
last year. The coefficients on the one-year lagged tax decrease are positive and significant in 
both specifications. The coefficients on the two-year lagged tax increase are significant 
negative in both specifications, suggesting that firms are less likely to relocate to a state that 
has recently increased tax rate. States with greater growth prospects (high growth rate and 
lower unemployment rate) and stronger fiscal balances are more attractive to business. Firms 
are more likely to move to location with a larger pool and a higher quality of labor force.  
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Effect of Headquarters Relocation on Firms’ State Effective Tax Rate 
 Our analysis rests on the premise that firms on average reap tax benefits when they 
relocate to another state. To estimate the tax savings from HQ relocation, we estimate the 
following specification: 
             State ETRi,s,t = β0 + β1Post-Relocations,t–1  
                 + φΔFirm-level Controls i,s,t–1 + φΔState-level Controlss,t–1 + FE + 𝜀i,s,t,                   (8) 
Where State ETR is the total state tax expense over pre-tax domestic income. Post-Relocation 
is an indicator variable equal to one for years after a firm relocates its headquarters to another 
state and zero otherwise. The coefficient, β1, estimates the effect of headquarter relocation on 
state tax liability. In Equation (8), we control for known determinants of state ETR, including 
firm size, leverage, R&D expenditures, firm growth, capital intensity, intangibles, inventory 
intensity, NOL, and pre-tax profitability. 
 The decision to relocate headquarters is not a random choice. Firms that are able to 
benefit from a HQ relocation, such as lower taxes, are more likely to relocate. Therefore, we 
select a group of control firms that share similar firm characteristics using propensity score 
matching on industry and the above known determinants of state ETR to mitigate concern 
that the observed HQ relocation effect on state ETR is not driven by the selection.  
 The result of the estimation of Equation (8) is reported in Table 7, with column (1) 
tabulating the result using the full sample and column (2) tabulating the result using a 
matched control sample. On average, HQ relocating firms experience a reduction in state 
ETR between 0.75 and 0.89 percentage points, which is an economic significant decrease 
given state ETR has a sample mean of 5 percent. 
7. Conclusion 
Corporate HQ relocations have significant economic consequences, not just for the 
firms themselves but also for the source and destination locations. Motivated by these 
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consequences and the recent focus on corporate HQ relocation across states, we conduct a 
comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon of tax-motivated HQ relocations within the U.S. 
by relying on exogenous changes in the corporate tax rates of the state where the HQ is 
located as a quasi-experimental setting. The state corporate income tax rate changes, as 
opposed to changes in other state tax instruments, provide a strong setting for our research 
question because their staggered changes across time and states allow us to draw strong 
causal inferences on the effects of HQ state corporate tax changes. More importantly, by 
focusing on state corporate income tax changes, we can use the state apportionment formula 
as a theoretical foundation to make cross-sectional predictions that can further strengthen the 
identification of the effects of tax changes. 
We document strong and robust evidence that exogenous changes in HQ state 
corporate tax rates alter the likelihood of cross-state corporate HQ relocation. Further 
analyses show that the tax sensitivity of HQ relocation is predictably less for firms with an 
HQ located in state-years that place lower weights on the property and payroll factors on state 
tax calculations, state-years that allow firms to better isolate their HQ activities from the 
apportionment formula, and firms that have less exposure to state taxation and a better buffer 
from state tax changes.  
 Overall, our paper contributes to an improved understanding of the real effect of tax 
policies. Our findings provide important insights into the economic consequences of state tax 
changes, which will be of interest to policy makers and state governments, particularly when 
states have incentives to engage in tax competition to retain or attract firms.  
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Appendix A 
List of State Corporate Tax Rate Changes 
State Year Description of changes in the                                                              
top corporate income tax rate 
Number of sample 
firms affected 
VT 1997 Tax increase: from 8.25% to 9.75% 4   
CA 1997 Tax decrease: from 9.3% to 8.84% 296   
CT 1997 Tax decrease: from 10.75% to 10.5% 60   
NC 1997 Tax decrease: from 7.75% to 7.5% 27   
AZ 1998 Tax decrease: from 9% to 8% 30   
CT 1998 Tax decrease: from 10.5% to 9.5% 74   
NC 1998 Tax decrease: from 7.5% to 7.25% 42   
NH 1999 Tax increase: from 7% to 8% 15   
CO 1999 Tax decrease: from 5% to 4.75% 88   
CT 1999 Tax decrease: from 9.5% to 8.5% 77   
NC 1999 Tax decrease: from 7.25% to 7% 40   
NY 1999 Tax decrease: from 9% to 8.5% 271   
OH 1999 Tax decrease: from 8.9% to 8.5% 101   
AZ 2000 Tax decrease: from 8% to 7.968% 35   
CO 2000 Tax decrease: from 4.75% to 4.63% 88   
CT 2000 Tax decrease: from 8.5% to 7.5% 77   
NC 2000 Tax decrease: from 7% to 6.9% 40   
NY 2000 Tax decrease: from 8.5% to 8% 275   
AL 2001 Tax increase: from 5% to 6.5% 16   
NH 2001 Tax increase: from 8% to 8.5% 15   
AZ 2001 Tax decrease: from 7.968% to 6.968% 32   
ID 2001 Tax decrease: from 8% to 7.6% 7   
NY 2001 Tax decrease: from 8% to 7.5% 262   
CA 
 
2002 
 
Tax increase: suspension of state net operating loss 
(NOL) deduction* 
532   
 
NJ 
 
 
2002 
 
 
Tax increase: introduction of Alternative Minimum 
Assessment tax (AMT) and suspension of NOL 
deduction* 
132   
TN 2002 Tax increase: from 6% to 6.5% 38   
IN 2003 Tax increase: from 7.75% to 8.5% 35   
AR 
 
2003 
 
Tax increase: introduction of corporate income tax 
surcharge of 3% on tax liability** 
15   
CT 
 
2003 
 
Tax increase: introduction of corporate income tax 
surcharge of 20% on tax liability** 
69   
 
CT 
 
2004 
 
Tax increase: of corporate income tax surcharge from 
20% to 25% on tax liability** 
70   
ND 2004 Tax decrease: from 10.5% to 7% 3   
AR 
 
2005 
 
Tax decrease: repeal of corporate income tax surcharge 
of 3% on tax liability** 
12   
KY 2005 Tax decrease: from 8.25% to 7% 15   
CT 2006 Tax decrease: of corporate income tax surcharge from 65   
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  25% to 20% on tax liability** 
VT 2006 Tax decrease: from 9.75% to 8.9% 4   
ND 2007 Tax decrease: from 7% to 6.5% 3   
NY 2007 Tax decrease: from 7.5% to 7.1% 225   
VT 2007 Tax decrease: from 8.9% to 8.5% 4   
WV 2007 Tax decrease: from 9% to 8.75% 4   
CT 
 
2008 
 
Tax decrease: repeal of corporate income tax surcharge 
of 20% on tax liability** 
51   
MD 2008 Tax increase: from 7% to 8.25% 40   
MI 
 
2008 
 
Tax increase: introduction of corporate income tax with 
a top rate of 4.95% 
37   
KY 2008 Tax decrease: from 7% to 6% 15   
TX 
 
 
2008 
 
 
Tax decrease: abolition of income tax of 4.5% , 
replaced with gross receipts tax without interest 
deductibility 
226   
CT 
 
 
2009 
 
 
Tax increase: introduction of corporate income tax 
surcharge of 10% on tax liability for firms with 
revenue over $100 million** 
51   
NC 
 
2009 
 
Tax increase: introduction of corporate income tax 
surcharge of 3% on tax liability** 
37   
OH 
 
2009 
 
Tax decrease: from 8.5% to 0.26% (phase out of 
income tax from year 2005) 
71   
OR 2009 Tax increase: from 6.6% to 7.9% 20   
KS 2009 Tax decrease: in tax surcharge from 3.1% to 3.05%** 11   
ND 2009 Tax decrease: from 6.5% to 6.4% 3   
WV 2009 Tax decrease: from 8.75% to 8.5% 4   
      
* We exclude from our main analysis two tax events—the suspension of the NOL deduction and the 
introduction of AMT—that are treated as tax increase events in Heider and Ljungqvist (2015), because they 
cannot be quantifiable to a rate increase that applies to all firms. However, we include these two events as tax 
increase events (Tax Increase = 1) in the regression specification that uses indicator variables of tax changes 
as the dependent variables. 
 
**We exclude from the analysis changes in the state tax surcharge rate because such changes are usually 
temporary. However, in robustness checks, we find that our results are not affected by considering state tax 
surcharge rate changes. As a state tax surcharge is levied on tax liability, we estimate the effect on the state 
corporate income tax rate by multiplying the change in the tax surcharge rate by the state’s top corporate 
income tax rate. 
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Appendix B 
Variable Definitions 
Variable Definitions and Construction 
  
State Tax Factors  
  
Relocation Indicator coded as 1 if the firm’s headquarters relocates to a different state 
between year t-1 and year t and 0 otherwise. Historical corporate headquarters 
location information is obtained from Professor Bill McDonald’s website at 
http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/10-K_Headers/10-K_Headers.html. 
  
∆HQ Corporate Tax Rate (%) Change in the firm’s HQ state corporate income tax rate in percentage points 
from year t-2 to year t-1. 
  
HQ Tax Increase Indicator coded as 1 if there is an increase in the top state statutory tax rate in 
the state where the firm’s HQ is located and 0 otherwise. Lagged values are 
used in the regressions. 
  
HQ Tax Decrease Indicator coded as 1 if there is a decrease in the top state statutory tax rate in 
the state where the firm’s HQ is located and 0 otherwise. Lagged values are 
used in the regressions. 
  
Sales Factor Weight The weight on sales factor of the firm’s HQ state’s tax apportionment formula. 
Historical state tax information is obtained from several sources, including 
state government websites, the Tax Foundation, Tax Analysts, Wolters 
Kluwer, and CCH.  
  
Low Property & Payroll 
Weights 
Indicator variable coded as 1 if the HQ state-year imposes less than two-thirds 
on the combined weights on property and payroll. Historical state tax 
information is obtained from several sources, including state government 
websites, the Tax Foundation, Tax Analysts, Wolters Kluwer, and CCH.  
  
Separate_NoAddback Indicator variable coded as 1 if the HQ state-year allows separate filing and 
does not enact add-back rules, 0 otherwise. Historical state tax information is 
obtained from several sources, including state government websites, the Tax 
Foundation, and Tax Analysts.  
  
Investment Tax Credits (%) The rate, in percentage points, of a firm’s capital expenditures deductible from 
its state corporate income tax liability. (Chirinko and Wilson, 2008; 
Department of Revenue websites). 
  
∆HQ Personal Tax Rate (%) Change in the firm’s HQ personal corporate income tax rate in percentage 
points from year t-2 to year t-1. 
  
Bordering States Tax Diff 
 
 
The difference between a state’s corporate income tax rate and the highest 
corporate income tax rate of any of its neighboring states (in percentage 
points). 
  
Firm-level Economic Factors  
  
Firm Size Firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. (Compustat: at). 
  
ROA Return on assets, measured as operating income before depreciation 
(Compustat: oibdp) over lagged total assets. (Compustat: at). 
  
Market-to-Book Market-to-book ratio, measured as the market value of equity over total assets 
(Compustat: at), where the market value of equity is defined as 
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[the fiscal year-end closing price * the number of common shares used in 
earnings per share + the liquidation value of preferred stock + long-term debt + 
short-term debt – deferred taxes and investment tax credits]. (Compustat: 
prcc_f*cshpri + pstkl + dltt + dlc – txditc). 
  
Leverage Long-term book leverage, measured as long-term debt (Compustat: dltt) over 
lagged total assets. (Compustat: at). 
  
Multi-State Operation The natural logarithm of the number of states in which the firm has a material 
subsidiary operation. Lag changes (from year t-2 to year t-1) are used in the 
regressions. (Form 10-K Exhibit 21). 
  
Sales Growth Growth rate in sales from year t-2 to year t-1. Defined as change in sales from 
year t-2 to year t-1, divided by sales at year t-1 times 100 (Compustat: at). 
  
Income Mobile Indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm is classified as an income-mobile firm 
based on the following firm characteristics: foreign income, R&D intensity, 
advertising spending, profitability, and membership in the high tech industry 
(De Simone, Mills, and Stomberg, 2015), 0 otherwise. 
  
State Inducements Indicator coded as 1 if the firm receives any state tax subsidy or special 
treatment from the HQ state in year t and 0 otherwise. (Good Jobs First’s 
Subsidy Tracker database) 
  
State Economic Factors  
  
Real GSP Growth (%) Growth rate of real gross state product, defined as the state’s real GDP at t-1 
minus that in t-2 divided by the state’s real GDP in t-2 times 100 (U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics). 
  
State Budget Balance State budget balance (U.S. Census Bureau). 
  
State Education People 25 years and over who have completed a bachelor's degree. (U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics). 
  
StateETR 
 
 
State effective tax rate, defined as the firm’s total state tax expense divided by 
its pre-tax domestic income. Set to missing if pre-tax domestic income is 
negative. This value is winsorized at 0 and 1. (Compustat: (txs+txds)/pidom)) 
  
Post_HQ_Relocation 
 
Indicator variable coded as 1 for the firm-years after the firm relocates it 
headquarters to another state; 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix C1 Additional Robustness Tests: Effects of State Corporate Tax Changes on 
HQ Relocation Likelihood 
In this section, we discuss and report results of additional robustness tests. 
Excluding California and New York Headquarters 
California and New York are the two most popular states of headquarters for our 
sample firms. Their popularity may suggest that these states offer attribute that many 
businesses find attractive, which could present a higher switching cost relocating out of those 
states. In particular, given our above finding of a differential sensitivity of HQ relocation 
decisions to tax increases vis-à-vis tax decreases, one may argue that our results may be 
driven by firms that chose to remain in CA or NY after their tax cuts. Therefore, to ensure the 
robustness of our results, we exclude firms that headquartered in California and New York 
and re-estimate our main results. As shown in Column (1) of Appendix C2, the coefficient on 
ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate remains significantly positive, suggesting that our findings are not 
driven by firms that headquartered in California and New York. 
Lobbying to change tax rates 
Prior research suggests that tax policies may be influenced by firms’ lobbying efforts 
(Baloria and Klassen, 2017; Brown, Drake, and Wellman, 2015). If state tax policy changes 
may not be entirely exogenous, this is likely to be a bigger concern for states with a small 
number of HQ firms, because collective lobbying effort of these firms is likely to have 
greater influence on state tax policy. As another robustness check, we exclude from the 
estimation states that have less than 1% of the firms in the sample.23 The findings provided in 
Column (2) of Appendix C2 suggest that our results are unlikely a result from lobby effort of 
local firms.  
                                                 
23 In this test, we dropped 23 states that have less than 1% of the firms in the sample. The excluded states are 
Alabama, Arkansas, South Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota,  Delaware, Maine, Montana, Mississippi, 
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,  Louisiana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma,  
Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming 
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Controlling for additional social and economic changes  
To alleviate the concern that other unobservable social-economics factors may drive our 
results, we consider a vector of 8 additional state-year controls. We control for other aspects of 
state tax policies such as R&D tax credit rate (∆R&D Tax Credits), job creation tax credit 
(∆Job Creation Tax Credits), and tax loss carryforward and carryback rules (∆Carryforward 
and ∆Carryback).  We control for state-year unemployment rate (∆Unemployment Rate) and 
unionization rates (∆State Unionization). State political considerations may affect tax policies 
such as the state corporate tax rates. Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) provide a detailed political 
background for each major corporate tax change examined in our sample. They find that none 
of the corporate tax changes appears to be driven by any particular firm’s lobbying activities, 
reducing the reserve causality concerns that states change their tax rates to attract particular 
firms. Instead, Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) find that changes to state corporate tax policies 
might be related to election cycles, the governor’s political affiliation, and the state’s budget 
balance. We control for election cycles by the number of years until the next state election 
(Years to State Election). We measure the governor’s party affiliation by an indicator that 
takes a value of one if the state governor is a Democrat (Democratic Governor).  
The results reported in column (3) of Appendix C2 indicate that the variables of 
interest remain significant at the 5% level, suggesting that our results are not sensitive to 
these additional controls. Since none of the additional control variables is statistically 
significant at the conventional level, we do not tabulate the results for the additional controls 
for brevity. Note that the inclusion of the additional control variables does not subsume the 
results of the existing control variables in our benchmark specification. 
Alternative econometric models: Logit and Conditional Logit specifications 
Our baseline model uses linear probability model to estimate the relation between 
corporate tax rate changes and the likelihood of relocation. The choice of model reflects a 
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tradeoff between the underlying distributional assumption of our dependent variable, the need 
to use high-dimensional fixed effects to control for potential omitted variable bias and the 
difficulty in interpreting interaction variables under non-linear model. We re-estimate the 
relation using logit regression with state, year, and industry fixed effects. In addition, to 
incorporate firm fixed effect into the logit specification, we estimate a conditional logit model 
(McFadden, 1973). However, the tradeoff including firm fixed effects in the logit framework 
is a significant loss of observations.  
Columns (4) and (5) of Appendix C2 report the marginal effects using a logit and 
conditional logit estimation, respectively. The effect of ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate is 
significantly positive in both specifications. The economic magnitude is such that for 1% 
increase in corporate tax rate, the likelihood of relocation will increase by 0.24 percentage 
points based on the logit model or 0.44 percentage points based on the conditional logit 
model. Given the mean value of HQ Relocation of 0.0162, the economic effects are 
significant, implying an effect ranging from 15% to 27% decrease in likelihood of HQ 
relocation. Overall, it suggests that our results are not sensitive to distributional assumption to 
the choice of HQ relocation.  
Alternative clustering 
We cluster the standard errors at state of headquarter level in our baseline 
specification. This accounts for arbitrary correlations of the error terms (i) across different 
firms in a given state of location and year (cross-sectional correlation) and (ii) across 
different firms in a given state of location over time (across-firm serial correlation) (Petersen, 
2009). Cross-sectional correlation is a concern because all firms in a given state of location 
are affected by the same ‘‘shock,’’ namely, the change in the corporate tax rates. We consider 
alternative ways to account for cross-sectional and serial correlation in this section. Column 
(6) of Appendix C2 re-estimates the baseline specification clustering standard errors at firm 
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level. This accounts for correlations of error terms within the same firm over time. Column 
(7) reports the results with two-way clustering at firm and year levels (Gow, Ormazabal, 
Taylor, 2010). This approach accounts for correlations among different firms in the same 
year and different years in the same firm. In both cases, we continue to find a positive 
association between corporate tax rate changes and the probability of HQ relocation. 
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Appendix C2 Additional Robustness Tests 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of the regressions that examine the effect of changes in state 
corporate taxes on the likelihood of HQ relocation. The same set of control variables as in Columns (5) and (6) 
of Table 3 are included but not reported for brevity. The fixed effects are not reported for brevity. All variables 
are defined in Appendix B. t-statistics are reported. Pseudo R2 and z-statistics are reported for the logit and 
conditional logit models in columns (5) and (6). For results in column (2), we exclude the following states with 
few headquarters: Alabama, Arkansas, South Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Delaware, Maine, 
Montana, Mississippi, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the level indicated in the table. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance (two-sided) at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Excluding 
California 
and New 
York HQs 
Excluding 
States 
with few 
HQs 
Additional 
Controls 
Logit  
(Marginal 
Effects) 
Condition
al Logit 
(Marginal 
Effects) 
Clustering 
at Firm 
level 
Clustering 
at Firm 
level 
        
ΔHQ Corporate 
Tax Rate 
0.0017** 0.0017** 0.0016** 0.0024*** 0.0044** 0.0015** 0.0015** 
 (2.21) (2.03) (2.04) (2.83) (2.67) (2.02) (1.98) 
        
Fixed Effects 
Firm + 
Industry×
Year 
Firm + 
Industry×
Year 
Firm + 
Industry×
Year 
Industry + 
State + 
Year 
Firm +  
State + 
Year 
Firm + 
Industry×
Year 
Firm + 
Industry×
Year 
        
Clustering State State State Firm  Firm  Firm 
Firm + 
Year 
        
Control 
Variables 
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
R2 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.08 0.09 0.26 0.26 
Observations 22,006 29,691 27,686 31,607 3,840 30,379 30,379 
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Figure 1 
Timeline Illustrating Regressions Specification 
 
 
t – 2 t – 1 t 
Relocation = 1 if a firm relocates its 
headquarters to another state between year t-1 
and year t, 0 otherwise. 
Independent variables: 
Lagged changes in… 
State tax policies 
Firm-level characteristics 
State economic factors 
State political factors 
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Table 1 
HQ Relocation by Year 
This table tabulates the number of firms that engage in HQ relocation broken down by direction  
(i.e., to a lower- or higher-/same-tax state) by year. 
Year Relocation = 0 Relocation = 1 Relocation = 1 Total Percent  
   higher/same tax lower tax  relocating 
1998 1,049 23 7 16 1,072 2.15 
1999 2,045 33 14 19 2,078 1.59 
2000 2,519 65 31 34 2,584 2.52 
2001 2,855 51 25 26 2,906 1.75 
2002 2,809 48 21 27 2,857 1.68 
2003 2,856 58 28 30 2,914 1.99 
2004 2,543 51 22 29 2,594 1.97 
2005 2,726 38 22 16 2,764 1.37 
2006 2,563 34 15 19 2,597 1.31 
2007 2,444 25 14 11 2,469 1.01 
2008 2,298 31 16 15 2,329 1.33 
2009 2,248 22 7 15 2,270 0.97 
2010 2,139 34 12 22 2,173 1.56 
Total 31,094 513 234 279 31,607 1.62 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regressions. All of the variables are 
defined in Appendix B. 
Variables Mean StDev Q1 Median Q3  
       
HQ Relocation (1/0) 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00  
ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate (%) -0.03 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Sales Factor Weight 0.56 0.21 0.50 0.50 0.60  
Separate_NoAddback (1/0) 0.44 0.51 0.00 0.00 1.00  
Investment Tax Credits (%) 1.81 2.46 0.00 0.00 4.00  
Bordering States Tax Diff (%) 8.93 1.66 7.81 9.00 9.99  
       
Firm-level Economic Factors       
Firm Size 5.29 2.44 3.48 5.30 7.00  
ROA 0.02 0.30 -0.03 0.10 0.17  
Market-to-Book 3.59 10.23 0.76 1.28 2.49  
Leverage 0.22 0.32 0.00 0.10 0.31  
Multi-state Operation 3.32 4.48 1.00 2.00 4.00  
Sales Growth 0.08 0.33 -0.06 0.06 0.20  
Income Mobile (1/0) 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00  
State Inducements (1/0) 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00  
       
State Economic Factors       
Real GSP Growth (%) 2.43 2.84 0.83 2.39 4.25  
State Budget Balance (billions) 0.00 0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.04  
State Education 27.19 4.24 24.29 26.62 29.78  
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Table 3 
Effects of State Corporate Tax Changes on HQ Relocation Likelihood 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of the regressions that examine the effect of changes in state corporate taxes on the likelihood of HQ relocation using linear 
regressions with high-dimensional fixed effects. Δ indicates lag changes (from year t-2 to year t-1). The fixed effects are not reported for brevity. All variables are defined in 
Appendix B. t-statistics are reported. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the state-of-headquarters level. ***, **, and * represent 
statistical significance (two-sided) at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate 0.0015*** 0.0016** 0.0015*** 0.0016** 0.0015** 0.0017** 
 (2.74) (2.00) (2.73) (2.08) (2.62) (2.03) 
Firm Characteristics:       
       
ΔFirm Size 0.0117*** 0.0140*** 0.0115*** 0.0140*** 0.0117*** 0.0142** 
 (3.17) (3.22) (3.21) (3.19) (3.28) (3.27) 
ΔROA 0.0006 0.0012 0.0010 0.0012 0.0009 0.0013 
 (0.14) (0.25) (0.24) (0.25) (0.22) (0.27) 
ΔMarket-to-Book -0.0006* -0.0005 -0.0006** -0.0005 -0.0006** -0.0005 
 (-1.93) (-1.30) (-1.99) (-1.28) (-1.99) (-1.33) 
ΔLeverage 0.0057 0.0009 0.0040 -0.0009 0.0041 0.0065 
 (0.35) (0.12) (0.45) (-0.10) (0.45) (1.33) 
ΔMulti-State Operations -0.0005** 0.0004 -0.0005** 0.0001 -0.0005* 0.0001 
 (-2.21) (1.02) (-2.17) (0.62) (-1.94) (0.60) 
Sales Growth -0.0111*** -0.0082* -0.0111*** -0.0082* -0.0114*** -0.0084* 
 (-2.70) (-1.86) (-2.86) (-1.85) (-2.88) (-1.87) 
State Economic Conditions:       
       
Real GSP Growth   -0.0041 -0.0003* -0.0042 -0.00027 
   (-1.08) (-1.65) (-1.09) (-1.50) 
ΔState Budget Balance   0.0254 0.0235 0.0282 0.0374 
   (1.29) (1.00) (1.41) (1.18) 
ΔState Education   -0.0015 0.0011 -0.0011 0.0019 
   (-0.52) (0.37) (-0.40) (0.53) 
Other State Tax Factors:       
       
ΔSales Factor Weight     -0.0084*** -0.0080** 
     (-2.88) (-2.27) 
ΔInvestment Tax Credits     -0.0005 -0.0012 
     (-0.12) (-0.28) 
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ΔSeperate_NoAddback     -0.0114** -0.0086* 
     (-2.59) (-1.70) 
ΔHQ Personal Tax Rate     0.0021 0.0023 
     (0.69) (0.69) 
ΔBordering States Tax Diff     -0.0014* -0.0128** 
     (-1.94) (-2.37) 
       
Fixed Effects 
Industry×Year 
 
Firm + 
Industry×Year 
Industry×Year 
 
Firm + 
Industry×Year 
Industry×Year 
 
Firm + 
Industry×Year 
       
Clustering State State State State State State 
       
R2 0.04 0.26 0.04 0.26 0.04 0.26 
Observations 31,607 30,379 31,607 30,379 31,607 30,379 
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Table 4 Identification 
This table reports results of tests of the parallel trend assumption by regressing leads and lags of tax rate 
increase and decrease indicators on the likelihood of HQ relocation (Panel A) and bordering state analysis by 
restricting the sample to firms with an HQ located within 10 miles of a state border (Panel B). The same set of 
control variables as in Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 are included but not reported for brevity. The fixed effects 
are not reported for brevity. All variables are defined in Appendix B. t-statistics are reported. Standard errors are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the state-of-headquarters level. ***, **, and * represent 
statistical significance (two-sided) at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Tests of Parallel Trend Assumption 
   (1) (2) 
     
HQ Tax Increase t–2   0.0008 -0.0005 
   (0.18) (-0.07) 
HQ Tax Increase t–1   0.0075* 0.0042 
   (1.78) (0.73) 
HQ Tax Increase t   0.0017 0.0051 
   (0.18) (0.54) 
HQ Tax Increase t+1   -0.0046 -0.0071 
   (-0.66) (-1.07) 
HQ Tax Increase t+2   0.0017 0.0012 
   (0.21) (0.31) 
HQ Tax Decrease t–2   -0.0158* -0.0308 
   (-1.65) (-1.45) 
HQ Tax Decrease t–1   -0.0102*** -0.0197** 
   (-3.47) (-2.07) 
HQ Tax Decrease t   -0.0136* -0.0141 
   (-1.65) (-1.35) 
HQ Tax Decrease t+1   0.0053 -0.0043 
   (0.55) (-0.55) 
HQ Tax Decrease t+2   -0.0016 -0.0050 
   (-0.31) (-1.06) 
     
Fixed Effects   
Industry×Year 
 
Firm  
+ Industry×Year 
     
Clustering   State State 
     
Control Variables   Included Included 
R2   0.05 0.28 
Observations   30,354 29,048 
     
 
 
Panel B: Bordering State Analysis 
   (1) (2) 
     
ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate   0.0106* 0.0252*** 
   (1.81) (2.88) 
     
Fixed Effects   
Industry×Year 
 
Firm  
+ Industry×Year 
     
Clustering   State State 
     
Control Variables   Included Included 
R2   0.27 0.44 
Observations   3,072 2,875 
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Table 5 Cross-sectional Analyses: Tests of Hypothesis H2 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of the effects of various tax factors on the likelihood of HQ 
relocation subsequent to corporate tax changes. The same set of control variables as in Columns (7) and (8) of 
Table 3 are included but not reported for brevity. The fixed effects are not reported for brevity. All variables are 
defined in Appendix B. t-statistics are reported. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are 
clustered at the state-of-headquarters level. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance (two-sided) at 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: HQ State with Low Apportionment Formula Weights on Property and Payroll 
  (1) (2)  
     
(1) ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate  -0.0050** -0.0066***  
 × Low Property & Payroll Weights  (-2.33) (-4.04)  
     
(2) ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate  0.0057*** 0.0065***  
  (2.84) (4.44)  
Low Property & Payroll Weights   -0.0124*** -0.0742*  
  (-3.51) (-1.87)  
     
Test (1) + (2)  p>0.1 p>0.1  
     
Fixed Effects  Industry×Year Firm + Industry×Year  
Clustering  State State  
Control Variables  Included Included  
R2  0.04 0.27  
Observations  31,607 30,379  
     
 
Panel B: The Firm’s Ability to Isolate the HQ Activities from the Apportionment Formula 
  (1) (2)  
     
(1) ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate  -0.0038** -0.0072**  
× Separate_NoAddback  (-2.15) (-2.15)  
     
(2) ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate  0.0040*** 0.0069**  
  (3.04) (2.62)  
Separate_NoAddback  0.0029 -0.0047  
  (1.35) (-0.36)  
     
Test (1) + (2)  p>0.1 p>0.1  
     
Fixed Effects  Industry×Year Firm + Industry×Year  
Clustering  State State  
Control Variables  Included Included  
R2  0.04 0.26  
Observations  31,607 30,379  
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Table 5, continued  
Panel C: The Firm’s International Tax Planning Opportunities 
  (1) (2)  
     
ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate  -0.0036** -0.0042*  
× Income Mobile  (-2.00) (-1.81)  
     
ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate  0.0019*** 0.0018**  
  (3.81) (2.00)  
Income Mobile  -0.0075*** 0.0048  
  (-3.83) (0.85)  
     
Test (1) + (2)  p>0.1 p>0.1  
     
Control Variables  Included Included  
Clustering  State State  
Fixed Effects  Industry×Year Firm + Industry×Year  
R2  0.04 0.26  
Observations  31,607 30,379  
     
     
 
Panel D: Firm-specific Inducements from HQ State 
  (1) (2)  
     
ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate  -0.0032* -0.0042*  
× State Inducements  (-1.86) (-1.76)  
     
ΔHQ Corporate Tax Rate  0.0018*** 0.0015*  
  (3.19) (1.74)  
State Inducements  -0.0087*** -0.0011  
  (-3.06) (-0.64)  
     
Test (1) + (2)  p>0.1 p>0.1  
     
Control Variables  Included Included  
Clustering  State State  
Fixed Effects  Industry×Year Firm + Industry×Year  
R2  0.04 0.27  
Observations  31,607 30,379  
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Table 6 Inbound Analysis: Determinants of HQ Destination State for Relocating Firms  
This table reports the results of the logistic regressions on the determinants of HQ destination state for relocating 
firms. The fixed effects are not reported for brevity. All variables are defined in Appendix B. t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the relocating 
firm level. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance (two-sided) at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
  (1) (2)  
State Tax Factors     
State Tax Increase t–1  0.0018 0.0022  
  (0.23) (0.29)  
State Tax Decrease t–1  0.0112*** 0.0108***  
  (2.75) (2.63)  
State Tax Increase t–2  -0.0105** -0.0109**  
  (-1.99) (-2.05)  
State Tax Decrease t–2  -0.0016 -0.0011  
  (-0.41) (-0.28)  
State Corporate Tax Rate  -0.0017*** -0.0017***  
  (-4.19) (-4.25)  
Sales Factor Weights  0.0077 0.0086*  
  (1.53) (1.68)  
Investment Tax Credits  0.0210 0.0220  
  (1.20) (0.52)  
Job Creation Tax Credits  -0.0020 -0.0018  
  (-0.73) (-0.64)  
Separate_NoAddback  0.0015 0.0016  
  (0.80) (0.79)  
State Economic Factors     
Real GSP Growth  0.0009* 0.0009*  
  (1.88) (1.78)  
Unemployment Rate  -0.0020** -0.0020**  
  (-1.99) (-1.99)  
State Unionization  0.0000 0.0000  
  (0.14) (0.01)  
State Budget Balance  0.0282** 0.0253*  
  (1.99) (1.76)  
LN_Population  0.0190*** 0.0187***  
  (16.66) (16.28)  
Education 1.   0.0027*** 0.0028***  
 2.   (7.94) (8.17)  
Industry Match  0.0207*** 0.0248***  
  (4.72) (5.27)  
State Political Factors     
Democratic Governor  -0.0036* -0.0038**  
  (-1.93) (-2.01)  
     
Fixed Effects  Year Industry + Year  
Clustering  State State  
R2  0.03 0.03  
Observations  25,650 25,650  
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Table 7 Effects of Headquarters Relocation on Firms’ State Effective Tax Rate 
This table reports the results of the effect of headquarters relocation on firms’ state effective tax rates. Control 
variables and fixed effects are included but not reported for brevity. All variables are defined in Appendix B. t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the 
firm level. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance (two-sided) at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2)  
 Firm Fixed Effects Propensity Score Matching  
 State ETR State ETR  
    
Post_HQ_Relocation -0.0089** -0.0075**  
 (-2.52) (-2.54)  
    
Controls Included Included  
Fixed Effects Firm + HQ State + Year Industry + HQ State + Year  
Clustering Firm + Year Firm + Year  
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.18  
Observations 25,323 3,508  
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